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Abstract 
Lack of coordination among agencies at project level and scarce promotion of 
contracts at micro-scale are critical gaps widely spread in many Latin American regions.  We 
discuss some specific and feasible mechanisms: (i) alliances for rural development and (ii) 
contract promoters; that may play a catalytic role to deal with the mentioned problems. 
 
Based on a continuous improving integral strategy and an effective operative 
framework, these alliances would be prone to unveil areas for interventions and to channel 
them into the pipelines of the ministries, financing agencies or private investor initiatives. 
These alliances can assist in solving tradeoffs between enough economies of scale for 
enhancing capabilities and sufficient local knowledge. Also, they might reduce capture 
problems. 
 
Contract promoters on the other hand, can be viewed as facilitators for startup 
businesses. They evolve as enterprise incubators, with expertise for rural areas, projects and 
marketing; combined with a vision for development. Both catalysts have a synergetic effect 
for coordinating regional development and should be prominent in rural modernization 
agendas. 
 
Key Words:    Rural development, Catalyst, Experimental, Promoter, Local Governance, 
Applied Political Economy 
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Economics is good at predicting equilibrium. However, the prediction of dynamics and speed 
for reach that equilibrium is not as well developed (Mas-Colell et al
3, 1995).  In this sense, 
several and diverse models try to explain why certain regions seem to attract more economic 
activities than others
4 (Head and Mayer, 2004).  They highlight the endogenous decisions of 
individuals and companies: where to establish, returns to scale and issues concerning 
information (incomplete or asymmetric). Some explain the differences according to the 
endowment of natural, physical or even human capital.  
 
More recently, social capital has been identified theoretically and empirically as a 
determinant of productivity (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fafchamps and Minten, B. 2001) 
Social capital
5  can be conceived as the social networks that mediate the enforcement of an 
ensemble of rules within which a society functions and the degree of trust people have on the 
validity of those rules. The most direct implication for this discussion would be that with a 
good endowment of social capital the projects might develop better, citizens’ participation 
might be enhanced, and conflicts could be better channeled.    
 
But, as we remark previously, speed and path of convergence into equilibrium really matters. 
We do not want to wait until the far long run. Thus we should ask: How can we increase and 
improve productive links for catalyzing regional development? 
 
                                                 
3 Section 17 H. Tâtonnement stability. 
4 See also the literature about New Economic Geography. 
5 Social capital refers to social organization traits such as trust, rules and norms and social networks that might 
improve efficiency in society by facilitating coordinated action (Robert Putman,1993).  Putnam links traits of 
societies with macro level performance. As Woolcock (1998) notes this interpretation is more integrated in the 
liberal theory of democracy in the sense that its concerns are more focused on elements that make states and 
societies function more efficiently and with better accountability. We prefer to use the concept of social capital 
in relation with collective action theory. Woolcock proposes a definition of social capital which would 
encompass norms and networks that facilitate mutual beneficial collective action.  Bordieu (1992) in turn 
defines social capital as the sum of actual or potential resources belonging to an individual or a group thanks to 
their integration to a broader and permanent network of inter-personal relations.  Bebbington (1999) in addition 
highlights the role social capital plays in facilitating access to assets.  
 In this paper,
6 we are focused on facilitating and enhancing development at a regional (meso 
and micro) level within a given basic set of endowments, rather than beginning by listing the 
shortcomings or insufficiencies at those levels. We start by showing some coordination 
problems that emerge from governance structures and lack of capabilities to find 
opportunities. Then, we move to discuss two types of mechanisms that could play an 
important role as catalysts (i) alliances to coordinate (micro) regional efforts of different 
agencies and, (ii) a system of contract promoters or facilitators. 
 
An improvement of such “contract environment” would certainly increase the potential for 
long term regional development probably thru  the proliferation of rural SMEs
7 
 
Developing good catalysts for contracts at meso and micro level is one of the most important, 
and maybe also one of the less explored, tools to unleash regional potentials.  If catalysts are 
effectively embedded in local societies, probably their multiplier effect will be stronger and 
sustainable. 
 
The main contributions of these paper are: (i) developing feasible in-roads to account for 
gaps in coordination at local level: the meso-catalyst; (ii) connecting that coordinating 
structure with a pool of catalyst at micro level that reduce transactions costs at micro level; 
and (iii) outlining a learning process to encompass continuous improvement of the 
methodology aimed at coping with those problems. 
 
In short, we seek to formalize means to foster development in a region by an articulated 
effort to favor: development of abilities, interaction between people and institutions and a 
good micro- environment to establish enterprises. 
 
In the second section, we review the state of the art regarding decentralization and contract 
promotion. In the third section, a regional development initiative that involves 3 Latin 
American countries and 9 micro-regions is revised. In the fourth section, we elaborate on the 
traits of the alliances for regional development. In the fifth section, the contract promoter 
                                                 
6 Following an analogy with chemistry, we understand a catalyst as an agent or  organization that speeds up the 
reaching of  productive interactions.  
7 Small and Medium Enterprises profile is discussed and the main challenges for its development are described. Finally, in 
section six we present some concluding remarks and suggest further lines of analysis.  
 
2.  Pursuing regional development.  How far are we? 
 
Public decision making is not aseptic
8. Recognizing that, we present a conceptual 
background having in mind the incentives that each agent has, whether extra regional agency, 
local government, investor or simply local people, to interact in mutual benefit engagements. 
  
2.1 Decentralization Trade-off   
Initially, Tibout (1956) states that market of competing municipalities will reach the optimal 
provision of public goods. However, the evidence that “people votes with their feet” doesn’t 
fit so much into reality due to transaction costs and information asymmetries. Oates (1977) 
approach of Fiscal Federalism advocates for the efficiency of increased decentralization, if 
there are not cost advantages of centralization. The problem is that there are advantages in 
some issues, especially those regarding technical capacities. 
 
But, in Latin America the question is not only at which scale the tax are collected and 
expenditures are defrayed. Decentralization favors efficiency, but not if one hastily delivers 
formal command without the resources (including human resources) to local authorities 
(Faguet, 2004; Vogelgesang, 2000). Some of the talents can be imported or developed, but 
trusts and certainties must be generated locally. The latter ones are processes that may be 
facilitated but one must keep in mind the   historic co-evolution of the population, its inertia 
and the dynamics of potential change (North et al, 2000). 
 
Formally, in the political economy literature, there is an unsolved trade-off regarding 
decentralization. It may facilitate the capture of local government, especially when extreme 
heterogeneity among actors' assets is present (Bardhan, 2005), description that fits with some 
places in rural Latin America. “Caciquismo” or “Coronelismo” has long been discussed as 
                                                 
8 In many analysis the state is considered as “one” benevolent entity. On the other hand, political economy and 
constitutional level of analysis remove such restrictions (Rausser and Goodhue, 2002), viewing those levels of 
decision to be also endogenous to players, which is more realistic approach for efficacious  in regional. 
development evidence of those captures (Freyre,1968; Bartra,1978; Roniger, 1987a,b). However, local 
governments have advantages in knowledge of local variables: preferences, type of the local 
agents and productivity. 
 
On the other hand, centralization increases economies of scale for technical capacity and 
decision making. However, Laffont and Martimont (1998), excessive centralization also 
facilitates the government capture, a reason why those authors emphasize the advantages of 
multiple agencies. In fact, North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000) warn that increasing the 
relevance of political decisions has diverse consequences: those with power have even less 
interest in leaving it. Sometimes, the fear to power loosing conducts the leaders to a sabotage 
of constitutional norms. Reducing discretion of authorities while, for example, protecting 
individual rights, reduces the loser incentives for breaking rules. Similarly, a big “capture 
premium” increases the propensity to use extra-constitutional methods to grab power or resist 
the policies promoted by those who detent power.
9    Nonetheless, even with multiple 
agencies and low capture levels; the local variables normally are not efficiently detected. 
 
Although decentralization is a very important issue, our focus is promoting development 
within the actual constitutional constraints. We recognize that execution and quality of 
interventions are very low, in part due to lack of local knowledge and coordination 
deficiencies by the centralized agencies, as well as to the limited economies of scale for 
technical capacities at local level. 
 
There is significant theoretical work describing the relevance of perceptions and incentives 
for service delivery and priorization at the local government level: political lobby (Becker, 
1983); regulatory capture (Laffont, 2000) and rent seeking (Tullock, 1988). On the empirical 
side, recently FAO conducted a research on Latin American rural municipalities and their 
agricultural services quality. Supported by quantitative analysis of 1060 field interviews in 
340 municipalities in 4 countries (Chile, Peru, Brazil and Mexico), it argues that successful 
decentralization of agricultural service delivery requires more than injecting financial support 
                                                 
9 See also some critics to the ideas of “prevent people from authorities”, especially in areas in which it is not 
feasible and  where the contracts are not enough, and should be included in a more general context of local 
powers.  For example see the case study of promoting  market for rural photovoltaic energy  in India by 
Radulovic (2004). and technical training: it requires the construction of sound institutions that are capable of 
governing the cooperation between farmers, administrators and organized groups in society. 
External support might be more effective if used to strengthen the institutional arrangements 
that underpin cooperation between actors with different governance functions. This study 
also shows a positive and significant relationship between the fact that local governments 
take actions in agricultural services and their perception that central government agencies, 
local voters or local interest groups are concerned for that issue. Local governments invest 
when they perceive benefits, either financial or political (Gordillo et al, 2003). 
 
Thus we can conclude that the actual dilemma is not about decentralizing, but about degrees 
and pace of change to guarantee efficiency and low levels of capture.  
 
2.2 Problems when "the solutions" are problems  
10 
Since the sixties, it is recognized that relatively less attention has been given to problems of 
regulating the conduct of legally independent but functionally interdependent public 
agencies
11 (Ostrom & Ostrom 1965). The literature for public-private coordinating 
partnerships is even younger.  Coordination   among agencies will be reviewed at both macro 
and local scale. 
 
(a)  Coordination at Macro scale 
Public problems are a continuum, and when governments and agencies organize their 
activities and establish their boundaries will usually generate overlapping. Increasingly, the 
world becomes more complex and, with it, multidisciplinary and multi-level approaches 
require new approaches on the definition of agencies’ mission and objectives.  
 
In a quick search we found more than 50 peer reviewed publications
12 regarding or proposing 
coordinating committees among ministries, secretaries, cooperation agencies or intermediate 
public institutions. Though useful in very precise situations, coordination committees are 
                                                 
10  This name was adapted form the Pritchett y Woolcock (2004) paper. 
11 Agency considered broadly as cooperation agencies, ministries, public offices,  corporations and NGOs 
pertinents to public interest 
12 Probably  there are much more, however in this brief survey we can detect that coordination is a very 
extended problem and that how make operative that coordination is generally managed as a black box. Use the 
search "agencies AND coordination AND  government" in Econlit and in ScienceDirect. probably one of the "jokers" in every coordination problem. It is the buzzword for topics as 
different as: forest policies, HIV and chemical dependence correlation, implementation of 
alternative energies... 
 
Coordination  committees are being used  at national level 
13 (e.g. inter-ministerial) as well as 
at international one (e.g. United Nations System
14 in 1998, RUTA
15 in Central America in 
1980 and  Inter-agency group
16 of rural development in Latin America in 2000) Coordination 
may be a useful arrangement and generally it presents interesting results. With these 
coordination committees central governments want to align their policies and, sometimes, 
they are successful, probably due to a combination of a strong political support with a good 
managerial protocol. However, commonly some overlapped problems appear: 
I ) Principal-agent problems: for example the no alignment of organizational 
policy and the incentives
17 for the agencies executives to collaborate and 
commit in searching  Pareto Optimal outcomes for all agencies (e.g. when 
someone is evaluated by the level of budget expenditures rather than by the 
final impacts). 
 
II) Managerial problems: best practices - like quality assessment, indicators 
setting up and continuous improvement - are not widely spread in those 
committees. Responsibilities are diluted in some circumstances.   
  
III) Monitoring and follow up activities are not always easy to perform, 
resulting in the sub-optimal quality of the committee outcomes. Incentives for 
                                                 
13 In many Latin American Countries are used for  environmental issues. In Chile are also used for transport 
planning , for rural and agricultural issues were established roundtables with different actors; actual 
administration has popularized such way of managing conflicts. In Argentina, there is a secretary for inter-
ministerial coordination. In Peru, for example, there is a committee for SMEs promotion: 
(http://www.mesapyme.com/). Also, there are Inter - secretarial commissions in Mexico (e.g. against corruption, 
for social development). In Brasil, there is a Committee in which Casa Civil participate in some sense as a 
coordinator, there are also some committees ad hoc, like Marine resources (CIRM) and for Alcohol-Fuel 
policies.    
14  The Chief Executive Board for Coordination and the pertinent High Level Committee on Management 
(HLCM) of the UN system.  This board was improved in 2000.. More information at http://ceb.unsystem.org/  
15 www.ruta.org  
16 Inter. Agency group (IADB, IFAD, World Bank, FAO, IICA, ECLAC, USAID and GTZ) was created in the 
Annual IADB Governors’ Meeting in New Orleans (March., 2000). More details at. 
http://www.iadb.org/sds/ENV/site_2129_s.htm 
17  Regarding problems in the international cooperation system, see Easterly (2002). politicians, in order to seriously support and follow up the evaluation 
recommendations: cross controls of mass media, NGOs, and superior 
authorities could improve the responsiveness of governments to the detected 
and reported gaps. (Gordillo and Andersson, 2004). 
 
IV) Participants on those committees may not have full fledge authority or 
simply no incentives to play an active role.  
 
IV) Non permeability: if it is mandated, the heads of each agency could 
coordinate themselves in a committee. However, in most situations, this 
coordination does not reach the operative level of projects. 
18 
 
V) Problems due to centralization of decision-making: although we assume 
that coordination among central government agencies is optimal, other 
problems persist such as the lack of information about local conditions, local 
preferences, local externalities and local projects operators. 
19 
 
(b)  Coordination at Municipal –scale 
Coordination at municipal level could be performed, like in the Municipal Councils for rural 
development of Brazil and Mexico (Gordillo et al, 2003). Recent evaluation of that councils 
mention that in some situations they are useful; however different problems could be 
identified: 
I) Capture by local authorities ("mayor-isation" of the council).
20 
  
II)  Councils do not increase too much the value of coordination, because the 
actual structure of municipalities serve as channels for those problems. 
 
III) Insufficient economy of scale for technical capacity, fragmenting and 
diluting resources.(Vogelgesang, 2002) 
                                                 
18  Serrano (2003) 
19 For some details about the relevance of the knowledge of local variables and the political game that generates, 
see  Besfamille (2004) and Boadway et al (1999) 
20  For example see the assessment on  Municipal Councils for Sustainable Rural Development in Brazil cited 
by Olivera 2004.  
 
IV) Councils that only operates "in the paper" for fulfilling requirements of 
subsidies catching (e.g. some of the municipalities for applying in the 
PRONAF program in Brazil, see Oliveira, 2004). 
 
V) Councils without enough local support. That's the case for some of the 
least successful territorial pacts in Italy (Italian Finances Ministry, 2003)  
 
Consequently, coordination at both scales is useful, but has limitations that can be overcome 
with institutional arrangement at meso-level. 
 
2.3 Frictions at micro scale:  background and the contract promoter 
We turn now to non- governmental perspectives on regional development. Large 
corporations can also work in the logic of the alliance, by being providers of good projects 
for both agencies and private business. It is important that large private projects be linked to 
local priorities.  However, micro and small enterprises and also potential one person firms 
need to operate in a different context, a rougher environment in which the reduction of 
friction costs and information asymmetries should be strongly addressed, but with more 
idiosyncratic mechanisms.  
 
Promoting small business is widely known as a strategy for development. However, how to 
operate that promotion is not trivial, especially if one seeks business sustainability. 
Incubation environment should enable the galvanization of new ideas, but also customer and 
quality pressures are needed, in order to guarantee that you are not incubating weak ideas that 
will only be a future demand for subsidies.  
 
Neither credit nor closed training packages could serve as background, and are not in fact, 
sufficient for developing abilities in practice. They are not contextualized to the problems of 
the firm, or to the real constraints which explains the absence of firms. A business promoter 
needs to be a facilitator making more in-business than in-classroom training. Also, an appropriate associative environment and an institutional arrangement for the coordination of 
those business is essential (Tendler, 1996). 
 
3.  Facilitating catalysts implementation: the Regional development project 
 
Considering the above arguments, FAO through its Regional Office for Latin America and 
the Caribbean is galvanizing the recent trend in many countries to focus on regional 
development by promoting a set of institutional arrangements under an umbrella project on 
regional development. In this project, we are trying to promote catalyst institutions at two 
scales. First, at meso level, a semi-endogenous alliance, at regional (group of municipalities) 
scale for project coordination and gain of impact efficiency in a long run strategic approach. 
Second, developing micro-level catalysts or “contracts promoter”, for enhance the actual or 
potential productive relations within and across regions. 
 
Background 
Territorial emphasis and coordination of institutional arrangements for development is 
actually a consensus within cooperation agencies for Latin America
21. However how to move 
from strategies into actions and impacts is not as well studied.  From FAO’s perspective our 
vision on regional development has been nurtured by a series of on-going projects: (i) Special 
program for Food Security (SPFS) in 9 Countries. Based on local characteristics and needs, it 
aims to move the endogenous potential, favoring human and social capital in practice, 
focused on the sustainability of food security in the target areas. (ii) Project of Sustainable 
Rural Land Planning and the SIRTPLAN
22 methodology, which develops a participatory 
planning of land use. (iii) Public Expenditures in the Rural Areas project, conducted 
comparatively in 21 countries in LAC
23, which studies appropriations and allotments, norms 
and incentives in rural public expenditures within the period from 1985 to 2001. (iv) 
Promotion of productive Alliances in 4 countries 
24, which developed a methodology for 
                                                 
21  See for example the new Strategy for Rural Development of  IADB, document discussed  in March 2004, 
with multiple cooperation agencies and academic actors at FAO Regional Office for Latin America and The 
Caribbean. Also, see the Brasilia Declaration, documented by FOCA and reported for UN Economic and Social 
Commission.  
22 Sistema de Información de Recursos de Tierras para la Planificación 
http://www.fao.org/Regional/LAmerica/prior/recnat/sirtplan/  
23  Latin America and The Caribbean  
24  México,Brasil,Peru y Chile increase the links of small rural producers with the rest of the supply chain, promoting more 
and better relations and favoring quality. (v) The study about role of local governments and 
agricultural public services, that is mentioned in section 4.  
 
Extent 
This project is kicking-off in 9 Latin American regions from Mexico, Brazil and Chile. The 
specific regions were determined in agreement with sub national governments, in order to 
have enough political support.  
 
Purposes and proposed results 
This Project of Regional Development aims to: (i) Create, or empower if it exists, an instance 
for actors articulation,  which define a strategy for rural development and materialize that 
dynamic plan thru the execution of projects at different scales of intervention. This plan 
should also contain an operative way for deal with contract promotion at micro level. (ii) 
Enabling the creation of permanent learning mechanisms which allow improving regional 
coordination and effectiveness of the actions taken. (iii) Adaptively replicate this approach, 
in a comparative study, which allows for extract lessons helpful to future implementations of 
such system in other regions in Latin America.   
 
Learning with an experimental approach 
A basic cuasi-experimental
25 approach has been used taking “equivalent” regions in Brazil 
and Mexico and helping them to develop alliances: a couple of high industrialized states 
(with their pertinent attitude and bureaucracy), a couple of high-tech agriculture states 
coexisting with under development agricultural areas and, some states characterized by 
socio-economically diversified rural societies.  
For dealing with observation biases, in this long run “experiment”, an expert group has been 
invited in order to guarantee some level of objective monitoring and continuous 
systematization of results. 
 
Being enabling and regulator rather than executor 
                                                 
25 Experimental Economics is the use of laboratory experimental methods to evaluate theoretical predictions of 
economic behavior Regional people have advantages in know what is feasible to coordinate. An external agency 
such as FAO could then offer: (i) an adaptable  standard for developing an alliance, with 
requirements for guaranteeing a good process performance (ii) facilitation for implementing 
that management standard (iii) advocacy for political support at higher level (iv) support for 
the promotion of that alliances and its projects thru a donors meeting and a marketing 
strategy. 
 
We now move into sections 4 and 5 to elaborate on both core components of the regional 
development project. 
 
4.  The Alliance profile 
 
Several development projects have had the temptation of by-passing the permanent structures 
of local power.  This, probably, in the short run is the optimum to attain full delivery of 
project funds and to implement step by step all the stages of the development "master-plan", 
which most likely was developed without consideration of local priorities. However, in the 
long run no subsidy is permanent and the sweet loans should be paid. What a bitter 
inheritance for the future authorities, which cannot even receive the accumulated knowledge 
of their organizations! 
 
Financial institutions for development
26 were frequently centers for project evaluation and 
coordination. However, they are not able to effectively evaluate certain projects, generating a 
bias for some initiatives, especially those which involve considerable transaction costs and 
abundant local-specific knowledge. The participation of banks and investment agencies 
within the Alliance could be useful for a common understanding of the projects by both the 
banks and their potential clients, and for a feedback loop in the evaluation of some contracts 
promoters, based on the repayment performance of their customers (the new entrepreneurs). 
Modern finances, however, require investment decisions to be independent of financial 
decisions (Brealey and Myers, 1991)
27. Consequently, banks must not define or create the 
                                                 
26 For example some development banks, like the Brazilian Banco do Nordeste  - BNB. 
27  Following Modigliani & Miller Theorem.  projects (they commonly do not have the expertise for generate or evaluate innovative 
projects in risky or pioneer environments), since they are just another alternative for funding. 
  
The “filling  gaps” approach of the alliances  
 
But how to solve that trade off between short and long runs between local priorities and 
entrenched interests, between cosmopolitan knowledge and idiosyncratic savoir-faire? The 
alliance needs to act like as it were an independent central bank
28 with a clear mandate, a 
vector of indicators and goals
29, with technical capacity for model, planning and executing 
the actions for affect the dynamics of that vector and with enough stability to overcome the 
electoral cycles and the capture.
30  
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28  See for example the successful Chilean Central Bank independent  approach regarding  Inflation Targeting 
issues in Corbo and Schidt-Hebbel, 2000).   
29  Development is not a single variable problem. Development is not equal to GDP. It is a vector of multiple 
indicators. For a critical point of view of previous approaches see Adelman, 1999.  
30 The term   Non Governmental Public Organizations (NGPO) has been previously used by Gordillo (1999) to 
indicated that  missing or incomplete markets demand public interventions but not necessarily from government 
agencies. It would express the provision of certain types of public goods –namely intangibles such as policies, 
norms and regulations- by private actors to infuse certainty and sustanability beyond political regimes changes. 
These are public organisms unlinked from a specific political regime but integrated to the public sphere and 
subject to scrutiny and accountability.  
  
What exactly is the Alliance? 
It is a coordinating organization at regional scale, which articulate local requirements and 
potentials with the opportunities (actual or possible) given by both the different agencies 
(governmental, international, cooperation) and the market, in a long run sustainable and 
integrated vision. 
The alliance is responsible, independently of who executes, about implemented projects 
quality and strategic coherence.  In order to fulfill its mission, it must have: a dynamic and 
integral strategy, an effective coordination system (with documented responsibilities), a 
process and product monitoring system and, finally, an effective commitment for continuous 
improvement of the system. 
The alliance is a meeting point for different positions. Conflict should be managed in order to 
equilibrate visions and regulate timing and sequencing. 
All the above purposes boil down to attaining within the legal framework, sustainable 
improvements of regional welfare
31. 

















                                                 
31   Formally defined as vector of indicators regarding economic, social, human and environmental variables or 
a given function of that vector and its dynamics.    
Social construction of the market
32  
In this regional strategy, "social capital for business" is needed. Some issues that could be 
included for an effective construction of those markets are: 
i. A continuous training and education programs aimed at creating in the long run a culture 
about the compliance of contractual issues: avoiding payments delays and fulfilling 
conditions of production and delivery (Fafchamps, 1996).  
ii. Incorporate / promote clusters
33 and agglomeration of business groups, in order to 
overcome the potential defects due to inadequacy of basic services and inadequate 
governance (Fisman and Khanna, 2004). 
iii. Promote exercises of regional foresight as a socially organized learning process 
documented in a dynamic strategy that should be translated into concrete projects. (Gertler 
and Wolfe, 2004). 
 
Emergent institutions at meso level 
Previous experiences and similarities with intermediate institutions can be found in 
developed countries, like the LEADER programs (EU, 2004), but with  differences on assets 
endowments, both on the economies of scale for technical capacity and on human capital.
34  
Meso institutions were developed in the nineties in Italy, France and Spain: some of hem 
were successful and other failed. Those which impact strongly in their region are correlated 
with an effective focus of Collaborative Governence (Culpepper, 2003).   
In Latin America, recently those meso-catalysts can be found in a variety of such 
intermediate coordination institutions: (e.g. Agropolos in Cearà (BR), UGT in Bio-Bio's 
region (CHI), Fidecitrus in Monterrey (MX)). These institutions emerged for filling gaps in 
coordination at meso and micro scale, but they are mainly structured in practice just as 
“project-making bureaus”. 
What is then, the value added of the regional development project when those institutions 
already exist? Considering that those are evolving organizations in need to consolidate this 
regional project may assist in: (i) defining an integral strategy for regional development, 
                                                 
32 Following  Bagnasco (1988). 
33  Cluster in the broad sense: it could be simple but integrated to the local value chain.  
34 Also, we can mention the ERVET (Ente Regionale per la Valorizazzione Economica dell' Territorio)  in 
Emilia Romagna . Rodriguez Pose, 1998. avoiding the usual biases towards infrastructure projects or segmented sectoral activities; (ii) 
Increasing the efficacy and efficiency of  the alliance processes, thru implementing a quality 
management standard (iii) enabling stronger links between the alliances and the agencies, 
spreading thus a credible signal of best project coordination practices. 
 
Implementing and improving Alliances.
35 
In almost all situations, those alliances are a kind of institutional arrangement which 
decisions are probably not mandatory in courts, due to the complexity of decision making 
and the incompleteness of contract. It means that such contract cannot be legally enforced 
(Besfamille, 1996), but the outcomes of an efficacious alliance are subject to be evaluated by 
votes (for politicians), and growth (for firms) or the reach of some goals (for interest groups 
and agencies). However, the voting scheme biases the decisions against long run social 
profit, favoring outcomes that mature early. For avoiding such effect, and allowing an 
effective Alliance: (i) A transversal appropriation of the Alliance and the long run dynamic 
strategy should be guaranteed. In this sense, the follow up of formal approaches of Change 
Management 
36could be incorporated as a way for deal with the de facto institutionalization 
of alliance. (ii) A “development vector” of indicators, as previously mentioned, should be 
integral and with enough level of consensus. It must include items regarding: human capital 
(not only schooling but in the broad sense), natural capital, physical capital and social capital 
(including the institutional strength). For effectively communicating the objectives to the 
broad constellations of agencies and groups that should follow up the alliance guidelines, an 
appropriate and consistent framework of indicators for each project and division could be 
implemented
37 (iii) For implementing and effectively operating the Alliance, a continuous 
improvement  quality system operates within the alliance, in order to facilitate an 
environment of accountability with managerial and mutual enforcement, considering likely a 
certifiable standard. The pertinent macro-stages are mentioned in Figure 3 and explained 
below 
                                                 
35  This section has benefit from the comments made in the Experts Seminar in August 2004. It was  a  
conceptual stepping stone for formalize some previous outlooks in the Regional Development Project. 
http://www.rlc.fao.org/proyecto/fodepal/Bibvirtual/psf/psfregi.htm  
36  See for example the Kotter’s (1996) eight steps approach. It should be applied avoiding to jeopardize long 
run sustainability  
37  For example, the adapted use of the the Balanced Scorcard (Kaplan and Norton. 1996) approach could be a 
pertinent way for chanelling strategic objectives into each process and Project. Figure 3. Stages for development and continuous improvement of the alliance. Start reading 
from the upper left corner.  
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a)  Identifying region, potentials and gaps
38 
i.  Identification of Region 
Region should be determined as a social construction more than a pure 
geographic distinction. Some level of intra-regional heterogeneity is 
desirable, for including and connecting at least one area with economic 
potential. Some level of pluri-activity potential should be searched and 
promoted.   
ii. Institutional  Arrangements. 
Institutional strengths and weaknesses should be documented. Local 
political economy should be modeled in order to best implement the 
alliance. Critical points for empower institutions should be described. 
Special interest in the analysis of relevant actors and current 
institutional framework for consultation, planning, research and 
                                                 
38  This sub-section has benefit from the outline discussed by Professors De Janvry and Sadoulet in the Experts 
Seminar described in a previous footnote.  training, regional marketing and coordination with national policies 
should be described. A plan for overcome the detected gaps, included 
those about technical and political competences, should be 
incorporated. 
iii. Productive  capacity. 
Potentials and constraints regarding competitive advantages for 
economic activities, including labor market, should be identified and 
promoted. Enough magnitude of projects package should be checked 
in order to configure in some dimensions a “big push”. 
 
iv. Social  incorporation 
Social strategies for reduce poverty and increase access to productive 
assets
39 should be analyzed and included in the programs. Safety nets 
and de facto risk reducing initiatives should be enough in order to allow 
best economic and social development. Any gap should be reported, 
including also a feasible plan to deal with.  
 
b)  Indicators and strategy definition. 
We can never win a game without counting goals. Each region should develop its 
own vector of indicators, mutually agreed in both the measurement and the source of 
data. Proxies should be analyzed accurately and considering their potential biases. If 
there no exists a data-source for a key indicator, it should be developed and included 
in the monitoring system. For guarantee compatibility and consistency, coordination 
with existing offices that manage pertinent datasets should be included in the Alliance 
management system. It should be implemented an adequate recordkeeping for 
indicators and their monitoring, including the statistical analysis. Each concept 
included in the strategy must be reflected in the indicator’s vector. Finally, for the 
strategy and for each project it must be a documented hypothesis which connects 
actions to undertake with the dynamics of the indicators vector, it also should include 
the key suppositions made.    
  
                                                 
39  Assets viewed in a broad sense:  including human, physical, natural and social capital.  c) Procedure  and  responsibility definition 
Processes that are key for final quality of the Alliance services should be documented, 
effectively implemented and continuously improved. The interaction of processes and 
the responsibilities for different persons and institutions involved in the Alliance are 
of special interest. The procedures could be auditable in order to verify that the 
alliance do what it promise to do. The pipeline for projects is a key process. 
 
d) Capacity  building. 
The relevant personal and institutional competences should be checked for fulfill the 
quality requirements of each project. The alliance must effectively promote the 
improvement of capacities, especially those of the permanent local institutions.   
e) Project  Realization 
i. Requirements  detection 
An effective and continuous improving set of mechanisms for 
detection of local needs and agencies requirements should be in place. 
The requirements should be documented in order to facilitate the 
compliance checks later.   
ii. Project  Design. 
Design process should consider both the micro-region and the agencies 
requirements. A documented checklist for project design should be 
implemented. It should include: fulfillment of a set of defined 
requirements, documented hypothesis for link actions with strategic 
indicators and key defined stages. Projects should be ranked and 
interactions with other current and past pertinent projects should be 
stated.  
iii. Project  Execution. 
Project execution will probably be outsourced. In this case, enough level 
of instructions and responsibilities should be assigned in order to allow 
for the proper execution. 
iv.  Project output release. 
Independent of who executes the project, the alliance is responsible for 
the release a product that fulfills the established requirements. If the product do not, the Alliance should promote corrective actions prior to 
release, if it is possible.  
v. Post  release  activities 
The alliance should monitor and report the compliance of 
product after its release. In some sense, the alliance should act like 
an ombudsman for detect previous quality problems and channel 
them into the pertinent agency.
40 
 
f)  Measurement, analysis and process audit 
An affective mechanism for update the value of strategic indicators and intermediate 
or cause indicators should be in place. Pertinent statistical analysis should be 
performed.   
On the other side, an effective program of internal and external process audits 
regarding the fulfillment of the planned processes and the resulted outcomes should 
be implemented and maintained. 
 
g)  Institutional learning and change 
Monitoring is not enough for guarantee improvement. This information should be 
properly used for make recommendations and improvements. In this sense: First, a Senior 
Management Review should be executed at least with yearly frequency. It should consider 
the indicators, projects performance and audits results for taking its decisions. It must be a 
meeting based in facts.  Second, after the detection of each actual or potential problem, fact 
that should be recorded, a corrective and/or preventive measure should be put in place and 
documented, in order to continuously improve the alliance outcomes. 
 
In conclusion, for the effective implementation of an Alliance must be a regional-specific 
process. However, a minimum level of management regarding planning, realization 
monitoring and effective learning is paramount for Alliance and regional success.  A 
checklist for the implementation of the given guidelines is going to be developed.   
                                                 
40 For example channeling them thru the pertinent departments or thru the Ombudsman department. It is 
preferable to document that communications and ask for deadlines.   
5. The Contracts Promoter 
 
Favorable local environments (Putnam, 1993, Bagnasco, 1988; Carmagnani & 
Gordillo, 1997);   and families (Buboltz, 2001) are capable to create some kinds of social 
capital (possibly in a positive feed-back loop) that coalesce in economic welfare for 
communities and regions. However, specific interventions are needed in contexts with a long 
tradition of exclusionary development and with a low endowment of entrepreneurship 
particularly policy entrepreneurship (North et al 2002; Gordillo & Andersson, 2004). 
 
Human capital is not only acquired at school, social capital neither. In fact, empirical studies 
demonstrate that familiar transfers of knowledge, abilities and networks are very strong in 
explain earnings (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In a world of equal opportunities an effective 
system of education for production must be warranted. 
  
 Inspired in teachers 
When Latin American elites were aware of the political importance of constructing a sense of 
national belonging and of imbuing a sense of liberation thru self-realization
41 (Freire, 1970), 
they generated one of the greatest efforts on promoting contracts: contracts between citizens 
and their country, their language and their history. The provision of such a private good 
(education) and the pertinent public good (environment with at least some level of cultural 
competences and cohesion, and other spillovers of education), by the state, was a successful 
enterprise namely during the alphabetization campaigns. Who promoted those contracts? Of 
course, teachers possibly formed at Universities or as technicians, but with some key 
competences that made possible to maximize the number and quality of arrangements (Seda-
Santana, 2000). 
 
Contracts Promoter (CP) Profile 
  A CP is a competent go-between actor that encourages links between people, 
institutions and organizations in order to engage in productive relations. This is mainly thru: 
                                                 
41 In the sense, used by Paulo Freire, it means increasing personal autonomy and solidarity. (i) offering alternatives (ii) co -developing business. Essentially, a CP reduces transaction 
costs. 
 
A contracts promoter should enhance the three kinds of entrepreneurship identified by 
Kirzner (1997): Pure arbitrage, speculation (inter-temporal arbitrage) and Schumpeterian 
innovation. In the first two, the entrepreneur operates in a world characterized by imperfect 
information and will discover opportunities for resources that others do not. By being alert to 
seize opportunities, the entrepreneur will buy under-priced resources and put them to new 
uses and new means. (Harper, 2003). On the other side, Schumpeterian (pure) innovation 
must focus on the process required to turn new resources into new ends. 
  
To fulfill the above requirements, the key challenge is that this CP acquires
42 the following 
competences: 
(i)   CPs while familiar with local circumstances and power relations must also be aware of 
the countries context and of the regional foresight exercises (strategies). They must manage 
the basic concepts of marketing and "competitive advantages" of their area. 
(ii) CPs must have technical competence to interact and impact the behavior of people in 
their pertinent range. Oral communication requires managing different languages of people 
and organizations that should be linked and negotiating skills. On the other hand, an effective 
writing is needed (Ball, 2003) for effectively transforming ideas into realities.   
  
Feasible implementation of a CP System 
Of course a CP with the mentioned abilities might no even consider working at a local level 
or once acquiring them thru local practice might migrate into other business.  A proper 




Regarding the implementation in practice, probably a voucher system or an equivalent 
mechanism like a co-governance structure (Ostrom, 1996, Ackerman, 2004) could be used. 
More important than specific mechanisms is the principle of access and of sharing 
                                                 
42  Acquiring by a trainee internship, by  previous studies or by any other effective mechanism 
43 For an interesting discussion on those restrictions, see Mas-Colell, Winston and Green. 1995. Microeconomic 
Theory. Oxford.   information for consumers and feedback for suppliers. Requirements about actual or potential 
disconformities could be classified in: (i) exit possibility, (ii) ex post voice and (iii) ex ante 
voice (Hirschman, 1970; Lepenies, 2004). Other systems, more centralized than vouchers, 
could also be effective if a whole set of indicators and quality management practices were 
established, in order to provide those 3 kinds of communication channels. Sustainable 
entrepreneurship facilitation cannot be put in practice without a clear alignment of facilitator 
incentives and an effective feedback of the final consumers, as was outstandingly pointed out 
by Tendler & Alves Amorim (1996).
44  
 
Figure 4. Schematic analogy between contract promoter and the enzymatic catalyst model 



















                                                 
44 See also the book: Tendler, J. 1996. Good Government in the tropics.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, the main concern we address is how some barriers to the development can be 
removed in practice and within the actual constitutional constraints, in order to reduce 
coordination costs, exclusion-based transaction costs and policymaking problems regarding 
long run sustainability issues.  
 
We showed that uncoordinated interventions by the states and agencies can affect negatively 
the impact of projects, or at least, block the potential spill-over.  
 
Briefly analyzing previous evidence about power allocation, we observed that centralized 
power has problems regarding the information about local preferences and capacities. On the 
other side, local governments have competitive advantages regarding those issues but lack 
enough economy of scale for technical capacity and contacts (which cannot be contracted in 
completely divisible units). As mentioned by Laffont (2000), we recognize that the 100% 
local corner-solution is not the panacea: inadequate decentralization can increase the level of 
capture by local interests, especially in regions where the capture becomes too easy due to 
"caciquismo" which in itself is a symptom of low levels of democracy, insufficient schooling 
and lack of social capital.   
 
Obviously different kinds of projects have different optimal scales for allocating power, but a 
portfolio of multiple agencies and multiple levels increases the checks and balances
45 and 
improves accountability.  However, then coordination problems emerge in this context.. 
 
A well known prescription are the coordinating committees of agencies at supra national, 
national, state or municipal levels. They help coordinate different agencies and probably 
impinge on the impact of interventions. Nevertheless, even if based on the best managerial 
practices available they may still carry relevant deficits of local information because they are 
not territorially embedded.  
 
                                                 
45 Following conclusions of Laffont, 2000. We thus advocate for an alternative and complementary approach: The Alliance. An 
embedded intermediate institution that, associated in a territorially based group of 
municipalities and integrating the main views of different local actors, develops synergies 
thru project coordination. This bottom-up approach reduces transactions costs and estimation 
errors about local variables; while guaranteeing enough technical capacity and including each 
project within a dynamic and consistent strategy that enables the spill-over. 
 
These local alliances could be classified as one kind of a more general type of "catalysts", 
aimed at articulating governments and markets, reducing transaction costs and information 
asymmetries. 
 
Another of such catalysts is the "Contracts Promoter", which helps to meet individual. 
Probably, it is the ideal for future generation of rural extensionists: with an approach to 
construct the entrepreneur activity assessing in situ local assets, competences and market 
opportunities.  
 
We are not suggesting these catalysts as short-cuts to permanent institutions in future 
regional development initiatives. Instead, we think that the actual government agencies 
should be adapted and enriched with more links at meso level and micro level, in order to fill 
the gap between strategies, real operations and desired outcomes. Formal modeling and 
simulation of the role of catalysts enhancing and speeding up relations could be useful to find 
new approaches.   Further research about special cases of catalysts, technical operation and   
impact evaluation of such organizations is a main challenge.   
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